This article engages with the work of three international legal theorists (Kennedy, Orford and Mutua) on the question of human rights and argues that whilst each provides a critique, each also makes a redemptive return to human rights. The article maps and critiques this tendency in contemporary international legal thought.
By the turn of the 21st century, if not well before, 2 it had become axiomatic to observe that we live in an 'age of human rights '. 3 This is undoubtedly a rhetorically inflated claim. It cannot mean global acquiescence in the norms of international human rights law nor anything like their universal application in practice, as daily reports of human rights violations across the world depressingly attest. What such a claim does mean (and, more to the point, this is a reality it helps to constitute) is that the language of human rights has come to provide the dominant mode of expression for political claims today. 4 In the words of one critical commentator, the malleable language of human rights is sufficiently capable not only of giving expression to the 'political program of revolutionaries and dissidents' but also of providing a potent justificatory resource for transnational corporations and the militaries of powerful states.
5
Today the ostensibly universal language of human rights seeks not only to transcend such tired modernist fictions as Left and Right; it sets limits to the very intelligibility of the political as such. But what happens when we frame our political demands in the particular and putatively 'post-political' idioms of human rights? What other languages and other avenues for the pursuit of social justice or for resistance to the ravages of global capitalism become silenced and displaced when we speak human rights talk (or are 'spoken by' it)? And what role might diverse modalities of critique themselves play in the reproduction of human rights? This apparent contemporary occupation of the political by human rights is the starting point in this article. I explore some of the discursive means whereby the language of human rights is continually reinstalled as the appropriate 2 The historical origins of human rights are fundamentally contested. As Philip Alston has recently, and perceptively, put it: 'there is a struggle for the soul of the human rights movement, and it is being waged in large part through the proxy of genealogy'. See P Alston, 'Does the Past Matter? On the Origins of Human Rights' 126 Harvard Law Review (2013 Review ( ) 2043 Review ( , 2077 . Much of the recent debate has been catalysed by the revisionist and genealogical work of the Columbia University historian Samuel Moyn. For his claim that human rights are discontinuous with earlier revolutionary natural rights discourses and in fact emerged in the late 1970s as an explicitly anti-political and moral response to the (supposedly) failed socialist and communist politics of the time, see S Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap/Harvard UP, 2010).
vocabulary for addressing, as Judith Butler puts it in the above epigraph, the impasses of the contemporary political scene. My approach to this question is not, however, via official or mainstream liberal human rights discourse but rather from the more oblique angle of contemporary critiques of human rights. 6 The spur for this article is my suspicion that critical approaches to human rights are themselves part of the reproduction (indeed, arguably, reformulation and thus expansion) of the human rights discourse rather than the source of its displacement or overcoming. That suspicion is enlivened by a particular tendency within much contemporary critical theorising about human rights, which I label the critical redemption of human rights.
7
When operating in this mode, much critical theorising about human rights actually ends up attempting to reimagine (and in doing so, reinforce) the human rights project itself. After having exposed its false claims to universality, its investment in and reproduction of a narrow liberal ontology, its propensity to circumscribe the field and possibility of politics, its inability to break with global capitalist ordering, its indebtedness to and repetition of colonial history, and a host of other related criticisms (in short: the critique of human rights as a particular form of Western political liberalism that gets exported globally with great violence), critical commentators on human rights nevertheless make a curious return to human rights. In this post-critical redemptive guise, human rights emerge in spite of their evident historical and political limitations as the site of reinvestment, reimagining and of futural possibilities. Another human rights, if not another world, is always possible. Something more than liberal, or neoliberal, orthodoxies can always be retrieved from the human rights canon. In this vein, critical work is expended on reworking and reinscribing the ideal of human rights (rather than, for example, displacing, overcoming or transcending it). In this article, I discuss some examples of this redemptive critical tendency in international legal thought and begin to problematise it-at least in (2012) 558, which engages specifically with the work of Costas Douzinas but which raises general issues pertinent to the analysis pursued here.
7 Of course, there are always unavoidable exceptions, some of them notable-my concern here is to analyse a tendency and its effects, not to argue that there are no alternative or countervailing ones. See, e.g., in contemporary continental philosophy, A Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil ( part, through some countervailing tendencies in international legal thought itself.
In each of the next three sections I provide a brief reading of three exemplary and influential instances of contemporary human rights critique, as represented by three quite different international legal theorists: David Kennedy, Anne Orford and Makau Mutua. Each thinker, while proposing a salient critique of human rights, nevertheless ends up reinscribing the possibility of politics within the (reframed and re-imagined) framework of human rights itself. Each thinker approaches the discourse of human rights from a different theoretical angle. For Kennedy, it is via pragmatism; for Orford, it is via feminism, psychoanalysis and post-structuralism; and, finally, for Mutua, it is by way of post-colonialism, critical race theory and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). It is with their respective theoretical orientations (more so than with their disciplinary affiliations) that I am most concerned. Nevertheless, perhaps a few prefatory comments are in order regarding my reading of each thinker as a proponent of a particular theoretical approach, and my interpellation of them all as '(critical) international legal theorists'.
To address the first of those issues, doubtless the attribution of the particular theoretical labels I have adopted here to Kennedy, Orford and Mutua could be contested, broadened or pluralised. Kennedy, to take one example, could just as easily be read in relation to American legal realism (itself connected, of course, to classical pragmatism through figures like John Dewey), to critical legal studies, to Protestantism, to Newstream and so forth. And, moreover, it is clear that each thinker both inhabits but also departs from, develops and supplements the theoretical tradition through which I am reading them. My reading of them is hence intended to provide a certain perspective on their orientation towards human rights rather than to capture or exhaust their respective projects.
Additionally, and to respond to the second issue raised above, it should be clear to the reader that I am addressing each of these international legal thinkers more through the lens of the theories they adopt in order critically to redeem human rights (that is, more as diverse theorists of the international and of its laws) rather than as representatives of some coherent and collegiate disciplinary enterprise called public international law who bring to bear a particular 'international law' approach in their work. Doubtless they are all trained international lawyers and their approaches are hence marked by a shared set of legal-disciplinary assumptions and textual techniques but this, in my view, does not suffice to establish a coherent subject position of 'international lawyer'. If they are members of an 'invisible college' then it is a fissiparous and a methodologically diverse one (and eminently the better for that). 
In this section, I focus on Kennedy's work on human rights, humanitarianism and the law of/in warfare (or 'lawfare') and argue that he exemplifies a particular critical attitude towards human rights that I call muscular pragmatism.
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Whilst this critique exposes some of the shortcomings of the discourse and its political operation (critiques whose logic and force might well compel him to move beyond human rights, as indeed he does in places both implicitly and explicitly), his central critical position nevertheless ends up reinforcing human rights, becoming a vector for the recuperation and expansion of the discourse I worry that the international human rights movement can occupy the field, crowding out other ways of pursuing social justice and other emancipatory vocabularies that may sometimes be more effective, such as religious vocabularies, local traditions, and tools focused more directly on economic justice or social solidarity. There are lots of ways to pursue social justice. Human rights is but one, and not always the most appropriate. I worry, moreover, that human rights, given its origins, its spokesmen, its preoccupations, has often been a vocabulary of the centre against the periphery. A vehicle for empire rather than an antidote to empire.
14 Kennedy here conjoins the literal and the metaphoric (or perhaps, better, the political and the epistemic) critiques of human rights as being an imperialist discourse. 15 But if human rights is an imperial venture, for Kennedy it is an imperialism that dares not speak its name, presenting itself as neutral, apolitical and external to networks of global governance. For his part, Kennedy rightly perceives human rights as a form of power itself and as a key modality of global governance. 16 As such, and contrary to the discourse's self-presentation, human rights are a key medium for the making of contestable, thoroughly political distributional choices-for creating winners and losers, prioritising some voices at the expense of others, and so forth. 'To the extent that emancipatory projects must be expressed in the vocabulary of "rights" to be heard', he argues, 'good policies which are not framed that way go unattended . . .
[which] also distorts the way projects are imagined and framed for international consideration'.
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For example, he discusses the ways in which channelling environmental demands through the prism of a 'human rights violation' excludes the potential of more communitarian responses (a 'right to a clean environment' versus a 'duty to work for the environment') whereas, in the field of global poverty, efforts to codify and institutionalise a 'right to development' embroil many in 'impossible legal quandaries' whilst local and dissident political projects are sidelined and 'neoliberal players . . . may find it easier to take over international economic policy'. 18 On Kennedy's analysis, human rights assuredly is a form of politics (although one which masquerades as an anti-politics), 19 but it makes its distributional political choices behind a disabling and disingenuous veil of humanitarian virtue. It is disabling to the extent that the disavowed 'dark sides' of human rights work remain precisely in the dark, and hence inaccessible to a pragmatic reckoning and responsible engagement. 20 It is disingenuous because, of course, these contentious distributional choices are being made and they are being made under the banner of humanity (which as Schmitt reminds us is a kind of cheating). 21 In sum, to follow this line of critique, human rights is a (neo-)liberal political discourse which launders political problems (often of its own making or to which it contributes) into the antipolitical currency of the universal, hence eliding material problems and alienating us from their true causes and possible solutions. If both Kennedy's critique and solution to the problem of human rights are sponsored in some sense by Nietzsche (his critique of the virtuous humanitarian evokes the latter's genealogy of the ascetic priestly class in On the Genealogy of Morals whilst his solution draws, among other sources, on Nietzsche's infamous yet inchoate notion of the 'will to power'), 22 Kennedy specifies his understanding of pragmatism early in the book. It comprises a 'pragmatism of intentions' and a 'pragmatism of consequences'. The former he defines as 'a clear-eyed focus on the purposes of our work and a relentless effort to avoid being blown off course as we seek to make our humanitarian impulses real '. 24 This somewhat idiosyncratic articulation of pragmatism, perhaps better conceived of as a recalibrated idealism, proposes to subject means to the critique of ends and to substitute for the enchantment of tools the more purposeful realisation of ideals in the world. It does not subject the ultimate end of humanitarianism itself to critique but rather aims to ensure that humanitarian actors do not get distracted from the attainment of that overriding goal through 'building the movement' rather than 'working on the problem', through 'pay[ing] more attention to compiling documents than developing solutions, to proclaiming rights than fashioning remedies', and so forth. 25 The latter sense of pragmatism is perhaps a more familiar one, involving as it does a focus on 'outcomes rather than good intentions'. advocacy-when they make strategic choices about which rule or standard to invoke, which institution to engage-they focus on the consequences' and coolly assess 'who would win and who would lose from proposed government action '. 27 In this more socially scientific vein, human rights practitioners are eminently more comfortable with making distributional choices and they identify themselves as partners in governance (which is where Kennedy would have them). As Hilary Charlesworth has noted, this understanding of pragmatism seems to take its meaning in constitutive opposition to the idolatrous, and is offered as a consequentialist corrective to a 'naive, devotional approach to human rights'.
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All this is doubtless apt, and yet something more than pragmatism is needed on Kennedy's view. If Kennedy's 'hard boiled' pragmatism evokes Weber's sociology of instrumental reason in modernity, 29 then the dangerous supplement to this pragmatism takes him at once onto territory both more Schmittian and more Niezschean. Kennedy argues that pragmatism itself produces problems for the human rights practitioner. It can too easily ossify into a 'professional language and practice of humanitarianism', 30 at which point a further dark side of this more openly managerialist endeavour emerges: namely, that it occludes a very elusive and important experience, the distinct human pleasure of exercising discretionary power unconstrained by rule or certainty. Kennedy worries that pragmatic evaluation merely substitutes calculative rules for faux humanist absolutes, allowing human rights practitioners the better to see and to calculate, but not to feel and to be responsible for, the awesome exercise of their power. He hints at this problem in the conclusion to The Dark Sides of Virtue when he enjoins humanitarians not simply to calculate but to exercise their 'will to power' 31 and to do so in the dark:
Ruling, deciding for others when we do not know-there is a freedom which comes when we realize that we are in power but that our expertise no longer guides us. It is the freedom of discretion, of deciding in the exception-a human freedom of the will. It can be pleasurable-but it is also frightening. There is also a terrible responsibility-deciding for others, causing consequences which elude 27 Ibid. In closing, though, the dynamic that I want to emphasise from the foregoing is that of a critical redemption of human rights via the means of pragmatism (suitably 'tempered', in the end, with sovereign decisionism and gestures towards abyssal human freedom). In his important, partly autobiographical, essay, 'When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box', Kennedy-while at the same time expressing an ambivalence about the very concept of 'the new' and of disciplinary renewal-nevertheless frames his intellectual project as one of trying to produce extra-vernacular knowledge, knowledge which pits itself 'against the [disciplinary] box' of existing international law in the name of something other:
My own search for 'new thinking' in the field of international law arose from an intuition, a critical impulse, that the discipline's routine efforts to renew itself had reinforced rather than eliminated blindness and bias. I felt a strong identification with the field of international law, with the promise and premise of international governance, with the perils and possibilities for cosmopolitan rationalism. But I wanted to think outside the professional lexicon, and I wanted to build the institutional and social conditions that could make doing so possible and enjoyable. This formulation hints that critique might perform a potentially transformative role in relation to human rights-not an instrument that can be used for mastery or self-perfection but a more troublesome ethos that might put some of the founding ideas of the movement itself into question, and even perhaps displace human rights as a means for thinking about humanity. But for all the imaginative extra-vernacular ambitions of such a task-for all the danger of 'raising critical voices [and thus] constrained, instrumentalist-renewalist terms. As such, the critical challenge he poses is too easily 'interpolated back into the disciplinary vocabulary' 39 of human rights and international law according to a logic he himself has so adeptly laid out. We are left with a human rights that is modified (and in some cases amplified) by pragmatism, not seriously disturbed by it.
Having demystified the apolitical claims of the discourse, exposed the 'dark sides' of human rights' investment in the differential economic distribution of global suffering, and shown how human rights ethically evades responsibility for these problems, Kennedy could well have proceeded to a displacement of the discourse of human rights and the construction of a truly extra-vernacular political project. (Or, at any rate, the construction of a counter-project which might materially try to come to terms with some of these problems rather than inflecting human rights differently.) This is both an explicit intention of his work as a whole and an implicit trajectory of The Dark Sides of Virtue (as well as an outcome logically suggested by his own arguments). Yet it is a trajectory foreclosed by the resort to pragmatism. 40 Instead of critically thinking beyond human rights, Kennedy critically reworks the existing idioms of human rights in a pragmatic voice and this rethinking of human rights, for all its muscularity, is ultimately a deflationary move which denies the potential of critique that he raises so evocatively. 41 As Charlesworth 39 Kennedy (2000) 460.
40 In subsequent work Kennedy has argued that the human rights 'moment' was 'a status quo project for a stable time' and that 'politics has moved on'. For him, '[h]uman rights is no longer the way forward-it focuses too longingly on the perfection of a politics already past its prime'. Here Kennedy definitely does gesture beyond human rights but the 'beyond' he invokes is the humanitarian decisionism which his own pragmatic interventions into human rights discourse have helped to usher in (and is hence on my reading not so much a getting 'beyond' but a pragmatic variation on a human Nomos Verlag, 1989) 353. On this view, the intent is not to realise through critique some project beyond human rights (indeed even the gesture to a beyond could be conceptualised as a routine move within a certain form of human right scholarship) but rather to displace human rights from within. Hence Kennedy would doubtless refuse my description of his work as effecting a slide from pragmatism as critique to pragmatism as renewal or redemption (rather, for him, these moments would be collapsed). So perhaps my critique of him is better recast in light of this dimension of his work not as him failing to follow through on his own intentions to realise a truly extra-vernacular project (even though this is a distinct possibility raised by his analyses) or as some form of bad faith but rather, and more simply, as a critique of the limitations of a project which attempts to resignify human rights by returning to it in a spirit of pragmatism.
observes, '[p] ragmatism in this sense . . . is far from being an extra-vernacular project or even one that would ruffle the feathers of most human rights activists'. 42 If, then, we want to think beyond that muscularity and more thoroughly to put into question the ways in which human rights deploys and mobilises support for violence, we need to turn to the work of a very different thinker: Anne Orford.
The work of the critical international lawyer Anne Orford spans public international law, trade law and human rights but here I focus only upon her critique of human rights. My argument is that whilst Orford develops a nuanced and incisive critique of the discourse of human rights based upon the ways in which it underwrites militaristic and monetary interventions into the global South, she nevertheless sustains a countervailing faith in its capacity to be reinterpreted against itself and to 'mean differently'. 43 In her critical reading, human rights- Council under Article 24 of the UN Charter, over unilateralism versus multilateralism-escalated in response to a series of genocidal, military and humanitarian disasters in the last decade of the 20th century (in Rwanda, in Kosovo, in East Timor). Orford's text does not itself make a normative contribution to such debates (or at least not directly or in their own (juridical) terms) 45 but instead proposes a critical analysis of the discursive conditions of possibility of the debates themselves.
Orford is particularly interested in the emergence of what she calls the 'human rights warriors' of the late 1990s (she cites Geoffrey Robertson and Human Rights Watch as exemplars), 46 for whom Western inaction in the face of the Rwandan genocide is the catalyst for a turn to war. These militarist humanitarians rely heavily upon the power of mediated representations of suffering humanity in order to convoke and galvanise popular support for intervention. Reading Humanitarian Intervention is thus, as its title indicates, an attempt to read critically the narratives (of suffering, saviour, spectacle and redemption) that work to produce the 'desire for intervention' in the West.
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On Orford's account, such neo-colonial narratives are crucial to sustaining the nomos of the newly emergent doctrine of humanitarian intervention. In making this argument, it is clear that she is motivated by a concern that the potentially revolutionary language of human rights has become 'constrained' 48 in and by these particular narrations and that, in its historical shift from a discourse of 45 Orford is clearly opposed to militarised violence in the name of humanity but her book productively sets to one side the routine normative (juridical) questions which structure mainstream international law debates about the legitimacy and limits of humanitarian intervention in order to pose deeper questions of the discourse. The closest she comes in her work on humanitarian intervention to answering the question of 'what then is to be done?' in terms not of a rethinking or a critique of human rights but rather in terms which might register as a more concrete, policy-relevant 'position' is in her 'Locating According to this aspect of the stories told by humanitarian interveners, the non-West is figured as a space of irreducible violence and suffering, a barbarian spectacle out-there beyond the gates of the Occident, relayed ceaselessly through tropes of reason and non-reason, civility and savagery, inside and outside, etc. All of this ultimately coincides in the identity-producing function of these humanitarian origin myths which aims 58 to produce and sustain a stable Western identity by localising and disavowing an abject non-Western 'Other', out there beckoningly beyond the Occident yet kept permanently in its (lesser) place. For Orford, these contemporary humanitarian scripts recall colonial-era narratives in their attempt to construct a rational Occidental . 59 Yet the construction of identity in narrative is neither a seamless nor a singular exercise. Rather, identities are constitutively unstable, fictive categories, and the narratives told to order and make sense of them need insistently to be retold so as to shore up the fundamental lack at the heart of that identity and to (re-)mark the racialised boundaries between self and other. There is a constituent and insistent irresolution at the core of the Western subject to which these narratives, compulsively and anxiously retold, give the lie. There are, of course, several important discontinuities between the neocolonial humanitarian narratives of the present and their colonial forebears, not least of which is the explicit invoking of the universal in the name of human rights. Whereas colonial powers could explicitly rely upon hierarchic taxonomies of racial difference in which the negative constitution of Occidental identity (as self-evidently incarnating universal values) could assume the form of a 'simple' disavowal of a racialised other whose obvious inferiority and difference called either for the infliction of untrammelled violence or, qua mission civilatrise, benevolent tutelage so as to raise the savage closer to an always unattainable state of universality, the advent of universal human rights complicated matters considerably. 60 This particular discontinuity further compounds the ambivalence (and pleasure) of Western identification with the humanitarian script, and the particular figure who indexes this heightened ambivalence is the human rights victim. In Orford's account, it is with the human rights victim that a certain productive tension is opened up and the possibility of a re-reading of human rights discourse emerges. Put simply, the human rights victim must be sufficiently like us in order to evoke our pity (or, better: mobilise us for war) but cannot, in her difference, be allowed to transgress figurative and material borders. 61 It is in its attempting to mediate these irreducible demands of the universal and the particular, of sameness and 59 Orford (2003) 182.
60 On the former logic, see P Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (Routledge, 1992).
61 We can see that the narratives of humanitarian intervention perform both ideological and material functions-shoring up an Occidental identity (and implicit claim to the universal) as well as materialising distinctions between Western and other countries (as Orford writes, the intent of such stories is clearly 'not to admit those suffering abuses as refugees', which would propose an uncomfortable challenge to the political superiority and economic privilege of the Western countries, 'but [rather] to intervene militarily and prevent exodus'). See Orford (2003) difference, of proclaiming a universal humanity which must then be racially fractured, that the humanitarian narrative comes promisingly unstuck. Orford writes:
The figure of the victim of human rights abuses is a representative of the universal rights-holder. In this sense we recognise ourselves in this figure-our sense of 'One-ness among the many' is premised upon a shared identity which invokes our affection or compassion when confronted with the image of the suffering victim. . . . Yet . . . the fetishised nature of the human rights victim also potentially invokes difference-here is a subject that is alien, external, foreign and threatening. The dependence on this figure of the human rights victim about whom we feel so ambivalent gives the discourse of humanitarian intervention its productivity for those who identify with the heroic subject of the international community.
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The figure of the human rights victim is similarly productive for Orford as she works to disrupt the identification mentioned above. In order to do so, she draws on the feminist psychoanalytic work of the Lacanian scholar, Jeanne Schroeder, who maps two different and opposed responses to loss. 'We are "masculine" when we try to deny castration', writes Schroeder, 'and "feminine" when we accept castration'. 63 Whilst the masculine position entails the disavowal of loss and the need to exile the feminine because she represents a reminder of the masculine's injured lack of wholeness, the feminine position entails an 'accept[ance of] castration, loss and negativity . . . [which leads to] the understanding that we are no longer and can never again be self-sufficient, complete and whole by ourselves'. 64 Relating this analysis to the figure of the human rights victim installed in the narratives of humanitarian intervention, Orford argues that the masculine position is exemplified in the hostile response to the human rights victim as a memorialisation of difference and a reminder of trauma: 'The hostile response targets human rights victims [for military intervention and then subsequent containment and denial of refugee status] because they are a reminder of the trauma of difference, and of the inherent I want to suggest that human rights discourse offers resources for attempting to create a universalist ethic that is not premised upon a denial of difference or a nostalgia for a lost, imagined wholeness. Human rights has the potential to found an international law that is not limited to supporting the fantasy life of nations and the international community through recreating the violent exclusion of the alien or the foreign.
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From this feminine viewpoint, the human rights victim does not so much represent a threatening post-colonial difference which needs to be disavowed and excluded by the Western nation-state. Rather, the victim on this account actually provides a lesson about the necessary (and universal) incompleteness of all identity formation. Such a chastened and ethical response 'requires us to be able to accept the "lack, gap and non-identity" which human rights memorializes'. In so doing, and instead of 'exclud[ing] that which threatens our perceived political unity, we can recognize the "foreignness in ourselves"' and hence 'respond differently to the claims of law's others'.
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Orford's (broadly speaking) deconstructive orientation in Reading Humanitarian Intervention means not only that any attempt to stabilise identitarian, cartographic or geopolitical boundaries in and through narrative is doomed to failure, but also that the texts of human rights contain the seeds of their own semantic overcoming, their own troubling excesses.
68 She insists throughout both on the power of the hegemonic interpretations of human rights, dwelling at length on their material and discursive effects in the world, and on the fact that such narrations are only a temporary and contingent 'containment' of other possible meanings (and hence not exhaustive of the revolutionary potential of human rights). 69 In arguing this way she hence refuses an ontological distinction between the pre-existing (juridical, institutional) reality of human rights and the rhetoric (whether instrumental or disingenuous) by which this reality is mediated. In place of such an understanding, she proposes an alternative and more complex conception of human rights as fundamentally bound up with narrative, as inescapably narratological. Yet as troubling as such a collapse may be from the perspective of mainstream positivist analytical jurisprudence, it is precisely in the collapse between nomos and narrative, 70 between law and word (il n'ya pas de hors-texte . . . ) that the possibility of law's rewording emerges. In an important sense, then, it is surely a mistake to read Orford (as I have done above) as having critiqued human rights and then recuperated or redeemed them for alternative emancipatory possibilities. Such a reading, strictly speaking, misconstrues the temporality at stake: according to such an understanding, human rights are always already different, there is always such a possibility installed in human rights from the very beginning (if indeed we can talk of origins). But here we have to pause to ask whether the figural possibilities disclosed by Orford within the beleaguered human rights canon, which ultimately lead her back to reinvest in the possibility of human rights in the final chapter of her book, ever manage to emerge fully from the margins of those texts to animate vibrant and dissonant political projects? Do they, as she argues, found a truly other-regarding human rights? Or do they in fact remain as unactualised textual possibilities, traces and memories, which solicit a certain faith in the human rights form-as endlessly capable of transcending its present instantiations? And how might we provide an account of the process by which that possibility is both sustained and yet never quite made real? I want to suggest that this redemptive potential of human rights is something which in Orford's account has not itself always been there (or perhaps not to the same degree). Importantly, in some of her other work (which both precedes and postdates the material I am discussing here), she omits or refuses to foreground the irreducible alterity (and incipient responsiveness) of human rights and insists much more forcefully upon the exclusions and circumscriptions of the human rights form, particularly as it functions within the context of a global capitalist economy To foreshadow a theme that I shall return to in greater depth in the conclusion, this 'other' Orford develops an account of the remainders of human rights language, focused more upon what it leaves out than what it might yet include. In her chapter, 'Globalization and the Right to Development', for example, she writes of her concerns that human rights discourse, as a matter of form, simply is not 'designed or equipped' to grapple with 70 See RM Cover, 'Foreword: Nomos and Narrative' 97 Harvard Law Review (1983) 4. globalised economic power and that the right to development in particular 'risk [s] reproducing the legitimacy of developmentalism as a set of institutional practices, a framework for understanding the world and as an alibi for exploitation'. 71 In her chapter, 'Biopolitics and the Tragic Subject of Human Rights', she goes so far as to suggest that 'human rights law in its liberal manifestation offers limited means for countering the administration of human life represented by biopolitics, and indeed in some ways supports this mode of governmentality'. 72 And in her article, 'Beyond Harmonization: Trade, Human Rights and the Economy of Sacrifice', Orford powerfully suggests that the form of human rights law is structured according to a sacrificial logic which forestalls attempts at democratic accountability or economic redistribution. 73 In these (and other) moments, Orford proposes a reckoning with the politics of the legal form that conditions the possibilities of human rights. These critical, countervailing moments in Orford's work stand in some tension with the deconstructive opening to possibility I have just been tracing and it is with them, and with the possibility of continuing dissonant political projects outside the form and language of human rights that they suggest, that I shall be concerned in the final section of this article. But, I first address the arguments of one final thinker who, in a sense like (my first) Orford, perceives in human rights the latent possibility of universalisation.
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Whilst the seminal critiques of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen made by Marx, Bentham and Burke do not share an ideological orientation, they nevertheless converge upon an important methodological gesture-a critique of the abstract metaphysical claim to encapsulate humanity (whether through insufferable Gallic presumption or bourgeois sleight of hand) and to render its essence timelessly in and as right. This critique of the false universalism of rights discourse remains a cardinal element of contemporary critical engagements with human rights, yet today it is those working in the fields of colonial, post-colonial and critical race theory, as well as TWAIL, 74 who seek most forcefully to expose the particularism, the historical entailments, and the self-interested nature, of the universal claims of human rights discourse. The work of the last thinker whom I want to discuss, the Kenyan-born and American-based human rights and international law scholar, Makau Mutua, falls within this category. Mutua has spent decades working within the human rights movement in a range of different capacities-in the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector and in the academy, in both the global South and the metropolitan centres of the North-and yet (or arguably by virtue of this fact) he occupies a liminal, interstitial position in the field of human rights-an 'insider-outsider' as he once described it. 75 This conflicted positionality helps to generate a deeply personal, polemical, yet incisive critique both of the theory and of the practice of contemporary human rights. 76 Here I focus upon Mutua's 2002 book,
Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique, which collects much of his critical work on human rights. I argue that whilst Mutua provides a cogent critique of the human rights enterprise that exposes both its Western ideological origins and its ongoing investment in a neo-colonialist mentality of saving the victims (and redeeming the savagery) of the global South, 77 he ends up returning to the form of human rights-albeit a human rights suitably reconstructed so as to lead to a genuine, dialogic and cross-cultural universality. On one level, such an idealistic conclusion is hardly surprising. The approach Mutua adopts is, after all, one that insists upon the possibility (contra the universal pretensions of an irreducibly particular, Occidental, human rights) of a real, cross-cultural universality. Yet, just as with Kennedy's critical approach to human rights, the logic and force of which invited a move beyond or outside the idiom of human rights only to fold back into it, Mutua is ultimately led back to human rights as the proper modality in which his cross-cultural universality is to be realised. Human rights are hence redeemed not via resort to pragmatism but rather by the search for (another, truer) universality. I will briefly sketch the context and general argument of the text before focusing on how Mutua's investment in genuine universality produces a return to human rights. If the political situation to which Orford's Reading Humanitarian Intervention spoke most directly were the discussions in the 1990s around the ethics and limits of collective security, then the political context out of which Mutua's Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique emerges are the debates, also in the last decade of the 20th century, over non-Western cultural challenges to the human rights paradigm (that is, in the restrictive and polarised terms of these debates, between universalism and cultural relativism). Prominent non-Western challenges came from Africa and East Asia, as well as from Islam. In 1990, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference's 'Cairo Declaration on Human Rights and Islam' articulated an Islamic understanding of the proper normative basis and juridical structure of human rights, whilst in 1993 the Ministers of Asian States adopted the 'Bangkok Declaration' on human rights-a declaration which, whilst affirming the universality of the human rights regime, nevertheless insisted on the importance of principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, and of valuing economic and social rights over CPR. 78 Yet neither Declaration per se has assumed a central place in the Western human rights imaginary-rather, that place has been occupied by certain synechdoches of victimhood, barbarism and savagery which have themselves come to stand in for the presumed conflict between values. In terms of African perspectives on human rights (read: the compatibility or otherwise of traditional cultural practices with concepts of human dignity and sex equality), it has been the practice of 'female circumcision' (or, in more polemic figurations, 'female genital mutilation') that has conditioned the debate, whilst in terms of the so-called 'Asian Values' debate (read: the debate over whether authoritarian models of economic development can be permitted to trump the protection of CPR) the names of Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir bin Mohamad have come to index the tension between (the Western) universal and the (Asian, cultural) particular. Savage autocrats and the mutilated bodies of women are the figural means through which we attempt to access the cultural particularity of human rights. Of course it is this very framing of the debates that Mutua seeks to challenge and he does so by intervening in the debates in order to first refuse and then reframe their terms. Unlike two of the contributors to the debate on East Asian challenges to human rights, for example, who assert that 'the challenge for Mutua hastens to add that his project does not amount to a 'wholesale rejection' of human rights and that it is in fact an attempt to salvage from the imperial remnants of human rights the possibility of a 'true universalization'. 92 Whilst mounting a radical critique of the human rights regime, Mutua is both reconstructive in orientation and committed not only to the notion that a genuine universality is possible but also to the idea that the extant forms of the human rights regime, if cleansed of substantive Eurocentric bias, can yet still serve as the modality for a future universalism. He refers to this process as the 'multiculturalization of the human rights corpus' 93 and in adopting this position he draws upon the influential work of the Islamic scholar of human rights and proponent of cross-cultural approaches to human rights, Abdullahi Ahmed AnNa'im. 94 For the latter, the importance of a cross-cultural approach to human rights resides in the fact that the normative legitimacy of the international human rights regime depends upon individuals throughout the world, all of whom inevitably live within distinct yet internally contested cultures, believing the precepts of the human rights regime to be 'sanctioned by their own cultural traditions'. 95 For An-Na'im, this 'broaden [ing] and deepen[ing of the] universal consensus on the formulation and implementation of human rights' takes place first within a given cultural formation and then across and beyond it, through processes of cross-cultural dialogue and exchange which seek to inform those within one culture of the normative bases adduced for human rights in other cultures and, in the process, to alter and expand those understandings.
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The intent is hence not to construct a minimalist 'lowest common denominator' settlement of human rights but rather, through the generative process of dialogue, to 'expand the area and quality of agreement among the cultural traditions of the world . . . [in order to achieve the] universal cultural legitimacy of human rights'.
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Whilst Mutua for his part insists that '[t]here needs to be a realization that the movement is young and that its youth gives it an experimental status, not a final truth,' and that any claim to the universal is situated, tendentious and interested, he is nevertheless clearly committed-through a deliberative procedural model based upon dialogue, mutual respect and inclusiveness-to the notion of reaching just such a final, genuine truth. 'The idea', he writes in a 2007 piece entitled 'Change in the Human Rights Universe', 'is to construct a truly universal project'.
98 Such an understanding carries him some conceptual distance from the more contingent, post-structural invocation of universalisation commended by Orford-in which any concrete claim to occupy the space of the universal is revealed to produce remainders which then return to haunt and displace it (in the direction of another universal which precisely never arrives). Rather, Mutua remains committed to just such an arrival. For him, locally and culturally delimited truths can indeed become universal: 'the question is how one gets there'. 99 We can see, then, that in spite of his damning critiques not just of the Eurocentrism but of the neo-colonialist ambitions of the present human rights regime, Mutua is ultimately led back to human rights as the means of realising true universality. Whilst he is attentive to the way in which European cultural and political traditions mark the content of human rights law and principles, what remains curiously unmarked (even unremarked) in his own account is the figure of cross-cultural dialogue itself and the forms through which this Habermasian process is sought to be effected. How, given the ongoing political and economic conditions to which Mutua is well alive-the massive imbalances in wealth and influence between the countries of the North and South, the colonising mandate of the international financial institutions and the architecture of global trade law and policy, the systematic deprivation of peoples of the global South and the evisceration of meaningful representative or democratic structures, the mediatised spectacle of global suffering (especially in Africa)-would such a dialogue take place? What form would it take in order to alleviate, respond to, counteract and rise above the inevitable disjunctions created by the material conditions just mentioned? How in such a situation might the deliberative conditions of an unforced consensus take place? And, more importantly, why is it assumed that human rights represents the best medium through which to commence such a dialogue, given its historic legacy and present investment in these conditions? In short, Mutua's critique of human rights unearths a genealogy of imperialism but then proceeds to reinvest faith in the ability of human rights to take its leave of that history, without ever explaining how or why this is possible (or, indeed, normatively desirable).
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B E Y O N D R E D E M P T I O N : A C R I T I Q U E O F T H E C R I T I Q U E O F H U M A N R I G H T S ?
1 0 1 I have shown in the foregoing analysis that there is a tendency, operative in the work of the three thinkers I have discussed (although shared more widely) to critique human rights but then to propose (a new) human rights as the solution to the (same old) problems of human rights. These critical thinkers advance what seem like damning critiques of human rights only to recommend not its displacement in favour of some alternative political project or imaginary which might grapple better with those problems but rather a rethinking of human rights in order to draw out a latent (radical) possibility or to formulate a different kind of human rights: a pragmatic human rights, a deconstructed human rights, a cross-culturally dialogic and truly universal human rights. I have sought at the same time to sketch how the remedy of a critical rejuvenation of human rights (albeit formulated differently in each case) either fails to come to terms with the nature or the scale of the problem as they have conceived it, or 100 In this respect Mutua's work is susceptible to a criticism made by BS Chimni of the first generation of TWAIL (that is, in the years immediately following decolonisation) which on the latter's account 'conceptualized the framework of international law as being neutral . . . 101 I draw the title for this section from the title of an essay by Alberto Toscano: 'Beyond Abstraction: Marx and the Critique of the Critique of Religion' 18 Historical Materialism (2010) 3. In this article Toscano discusses the early Marx's critique of the Young Hegelian atheistic critique of religion (in Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach, for example) as being insufficiently attuned to the material conditions of religious thought and to 'how,' in Toscano's words, 'these conditions might themselves be transformed' (ibid 10). I by no means claim to have made out such a critique here (namely a 'critique' in the dual sense of an analysis of the conditions of possibility of the redemptive mode of human rights critique and a more radical pushing beyond it) but have merely tried to sketch the beginning and the outlines of such a project.
else confronts or engenders different kinds of problems. With Kennedy we saw how the crucial limitations of the human rights movement were to be addressed not by an embrace of those other projects of social or economic justice but rather by a reconciliation of the human rights movement with its own, disavowed, governmental power: a disenchanted pragmatism supercharged with evocations of decisionistic responsibility. But despite addressing the 'will to marginality' and apolitical disingenuousness of human rights this pragmatic recuperation left unaddressed the ways in which human rights, coincident in crucial respects with neoliberal discourse, displaced more promising local and radical projects and functioned within the logic of global capitalism. With Orford we saw how the statist and militaristic capture of the narratives of humanitarian intervention and the ways in which this capture legitimated imperial and monetary interventions could be countered by another reading of human rights which emphasised an opening to alterity and the inscription within human rights discourse of a different, ethical relation to the other. But on the account given in Reading Humanitarian Intervention we are left to wonder how and under what conditions these new, properly other-regarding, narratives of human rights could take hold and establish themselves as a legible alternative to the dominant, bellicose narratives of intervention. And how effective could they be in countering the demands and seductions of the mainstream discourse? With Mutua we saw how a critique of the Eurocentric discourse of universality, which historically underpinned human rights, led him to advocate a more genuine universalism. This was to be achieved not via some other modality, breaking radically from that imperial history and the forms it has bequeathed to political modernity, 102 but rather from within the discourse of human rights itself-by reconstructing it according to principles of proceduralism, dialogue and cross-cultural interaction. But this faith in the infinite perfectibility of the human rights form did not suggest how such a dialogue might take place under conditions structured by neo-colonial power relations or indeed whether the form of human rights might itself be marked in more profound ways by that very colonial history. So far, I have simply sought to illustrate this tendency within contemporary critical approaches to human rights but I now want to spend some time discussing its ramifications and, more specifically, to begin to problematise it. But I should perhaps first venture some reasons as to why this redemptive return to human rights manifests itself in the work of each of the three thinkers (themselves emblematic of a particular methodological approach and representative of a range of other scholars who make this same move). 103 This is not so much a difficult as a speculative task given that the redemptive turn is not something explicitly thematised by Kennedy, Orford or Mutua. 104 Nevertheless, in my view, there is both something about the investments of contemporary critique (as variously practised by the three) and about human rights itself as a legal-political formation (that is, the object of their critiques) which tend to produce, or at the very least to open the possibility for, the kind of redemptive reading I have traced in the preceding sections. To start with the question of contemporary modes of critique, and appreciating that each of these thinkers are subtly different, we might broadly capture their critical orientation towards human rights with the term genealogical. 'It is a feature of our contemporary condition', writes the political theorist David Owen helpfully, 'that we are aware that our moral and political values, and our ways of thinking about them, are the product of a historical process that could, in various ways, have been different '. 105 This genealogical (and hence anti-essentialist and anti-necessitarian) awareness of the historicity and contingency of human rights is shared by each of the thinkers I have addressed here. For them, human rights is a thoroughly contingent political artefact that lacks a unitary and essential meaning and hence a telos. Indeed, other meanings both exist within the dominant discourse of human rights and impinge upon it from outside, and it is because of this contingency and plurality of perspectives that human rights can be made to mean otherwise by recalling these historic meanings or by mobilising these other possibilities. We see this most explicitly in Orford's attempt to destabilise the dominant meaning of intervention narratives and in Mutua's attempt to reinvest the (neo-)colonial form of human rights with cross-cultural meaning and legitimacy. But we also sense it in Kennedy's assertion at the beginning of The Dark hasten to add). But critique in this genealogical mode (be it Nietzschean, Foucaultian, or some other kind of historicising or epistemologically constructivist theory) does concern itself with exposing the hidden margins of possibility within the present, unearthing the fractures and lines of flight disclosed by the seemingly impenetrable political forces of the day. It hence frequently results in attempts to retrieve from the existing political or legal mechanisms new (or forgotten) possibilities-and often, and this is of course something which is most explicit in Kennedy's writings, to work pragmatically within the horizon of existent mechanisms in order to modify or renovate them, to work tactically with the tools at hand (especially when those tools, like human rights, are so powerful and hegemonically entrenched). So, to hazard a possible diagnosis of why the turn to redemption manifests itself in these three thinkers, we could say that they each partake of this (broadly conceived) genealogical impulse so dominant in contemporary critical engagements with law and politics and that one of the symptoms of this is an affirmative turning back (a redemption, as I have called it) to the tradition under critique in order to retrieve something new from the old, something other from the same. But there is something to be said in addition about human rights as a particular object of critique, which solicits such types of redemptive engagement, and it is, rather obviously, its much-vaunted universality. The normative attraction to universality is, again, at its strongest in the work of both Orford and Mutua. The universal is figured very differently in each of their engagements. Orford's universalist ethic is a more mobile, contingent and post-structural evocation of the universal-one which never quite arrives but which still operates as an impossible horizon, whereas Mutua's universal is figured very much as a destination at which the global human rights community will arrive if it only adopts the requisite deliberative, dialogic, cross-culturally valid procedures. There is obviously a strong normative attraction to the possibility of universalisation that human rights, even in its critically disabused forms, still holds out. (In terms of international law more broadly doubtless the clearest example of this is to be found in the work of Martti Koskenniemi, whose critique of the 'kitsch' universalism of European public international law leads him, via the work of Laclau and Mouffe, to recommend the contingent universality of a 'culture of formalism'.
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) Both the generalisability of 'right' and the universality of the human serve to index this possibility and hence solicit the kind of redemptive engagement with human rights that I have traced here-more so, I would suggest, than the operative concepts of other legal or regulatory regimes (such as labour law or anti-discrimination legislation, for example) which are not so obviously oriented towards the universal.
So we might say that with critical genealogies of human rights there is a particular pull towards the redemptive which none of the thinkers I have discussed has quite managed to avoid. But having proposed some reasons as to why the redemptive logic plays out in the way that it does, I want, in the remainder of this article, to problematise it, along two lines: the limits of contingency and the politics of legal form. These are distinct yet implicated lines of analysis but I shall deal with them here in sequence. What I want to do in each case is to sketch the outlines of the analysis, to show how it might relate to the critiques I have discussed here, and to conclude by raising some questions for future scholarship in the area. In so doing I shall make use of the work of two international legal theorists-one of whom, Anne Orford, I have already discussed at length (albeit in a different guise). I chose the three thinkers with whom I engaged in the preceding sections of this article because they represented with some clarity and theoretical sophistication a certain form of redemptive engagement with human rights, albeit in methodologically diverse ways. I was at pains to say that the particular engagement I was emphasising could not be taken to represent the entirety of their political engagement with human rights or with international law. And indeed in Orford, as I will show, we find post-9/11, a counter-tendency which, in my view, is useful in problematising the redemptive return to human rights in her earlier work. , has led Orford amongst the three thinkers subsequently to revise her views. This question deserves greater discussion than I can provide in this note but let me briefly sketch the outlines of my position. Clearly Orford's work on human rights and the narratives of humanitarian intervention is (of the three thinkers discussed here) most sensitively attuned to the ways in which different meanings of human rights are generated and deployed. The post-Iraq War context to which I am referring is one in which global relations were predominantly understood in terms of a civilisational conflict between terrorists who threatened 'our' liberal democratic, human rights-protective societies (to which preventive war and the restriction of rights was frequently the claimed solution). In this context, as many commentators observed at the time and since, the language of human rights was all too easily co-opted in the service of a bellicose liberal humanitarianism (of precisely the sort Orford had critiqued in Reading Humanitarian Intervention). It is noticeable that in published work subsequent to this point Orford not only refuses to make the critically redemptive argument that I have myself critiqued here but also engages much less with human rights and indeed relinquishes them as a frame of analysis. For example, in Orford's most recent book on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept under international law, references to human rights are conspicuous by their absence and she reads the R2P through histories of UN executive rule in the post-WWII developing world. We might compare this analytic approach to the orthodox one which would perceive in the R2P a greater global respect for human rights and attendant restriction of state sovereignty: cf. Orford (2011) Marks, in homage to Roberto Unger, names the tendency she describes in the above passage 'false contingency'. If, following Unger, himself following in the wake of critical thinkers from Marx to Foucault, 'false necessity' names the condition of turning the contingent into the supposedly necessary (to which everything from historical materialism to genealogy can serve as a useful critical antidote), then 'false contingency' names the reverse condition: thinking that things can too easily be made anew, simply because they are not necessary but rather have been socially and politically constructed. As the above quotation makes clear, the critical work of exposing the contingent nature of these institutions and practices is not strictly speaking false or misguided but rather something which, valuable as it is, needs to be conducted within certain limits and with an appreciation of the determining (often overwhelming) force of historical circumstances. The emphasis on the contingency of human rights and the availability of different futures within the discourse animates each of the different critical approaches I have discussed, and it inclines them towards critical approaches which seek within human rights the possibility of its being otherwise. But, following Marks's critical corrective of 'false contingency', must we not also begin to question the limits of such an approach? Are any and all possible meanings of 'the human' available within contemporary human rights discourse or is it structured so as to exclude certain figures of the human, certain ways of being or of performing that humanity? Is there a limit to the contingency (and hence future possibilities) of human rights and, if so, where and how is the limit drawn (and redrawn)? And under what conditions might a critical diagnosis of the contingent actually contribute to the reformation of the discourse rather than its exposure? What are the relevant contexts, with their 'systematic constraints and pressures' (in Marks's words), that go to condition the contingent, and how does this conditioning take place? These contexts are doubtless multiple and overlapping, but here the most obvious (and one of the most pointed, in terms of human well-being) must surely be that of the expanse of neo-liberal capitalist relations across the globe. On many accounts, human rights as a political project seeks not to break with or contest the logic of capitalism but instead to ameliorate or to 'civilise' it. How to think about this particular political-economic 'context' in terms of the rationing of contingency, and of the ways in which what look like available possibilities become quickly foreclosed? Well, we might understand Cold Warera ideological contests between the proponents of CPR and the proponents of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) as a contest over the very meaning of the 'human' of human rights. Are human rights to be limited to a certain 19th-century understanding in which the subject's liberty, property and security are the only qualities of human being worth protecting? Or are entitlements to health, welfare, education and so forth to be seen as an essential constituent of what it means to be, or to flourish, as a human? In answering this question we might well conclude that the historical updating of the human rights canonfrom negative to positive rights, from CPR to ESCR-vindicates the contingent promise of human rights and its ability to generate new meanings from within the discourse. 113 Human rights are now so much more than they once were; new content, new understandings of the human, have been incorporated into the evolving narrative. And yet the deeply unsatisfying record of socio-economic rights jurisprudence in terms of securing the minimal entitlements to government assistance that they purport to guarantee compels us to return to the set of questions raised by Marks's analysis of 'false contingency'. 114 Why is it that the supposed openness of human rights discourse (to political contest over what attaches to human dignity, to historical updating in light of changed circumstances, to new figurations of the human and new ways of being) can so comfortably subsist with a very predictable and quite rigid outcome: the prioritised protection of a familiar set of rights functional to the operation of market exchange. Is it a failure of political will to translate the more fulsome (yet marginal) visions of human rights discourse into material reality? Or might that failure properly be comprehended as a function of human rights themselves? An alternative way to understand the relation is that the context of global capitalism sets a limit to the contingency of human rights such that any dissident vision of what it means to be human that seriously challenges the 113 Such a progressive history is frequently taken to dispose, for example, of the classic Marxist critique of the individualism of rights discourse. See, e.g., S Brown, 'The Problem with Marx on Rights' 2 Journal of Human Rights (2003) 517, but here the problem is actually not with Marx but with the curious temporality that assumes the historically limited (and hence anachronistic) nature of the latter's critique of the Rights of Man as opposed to the transcendent ability of rights to change over time-all of which assumes that the Marxist critique has not itself migrated, developed, been transposed and translated and adapted, that there is no Marxist critique of embedded liberalism and the welfare state, and so forth. operation of market systems appears simply unintelligible or unrealisable. A human right collectively to control the means of production is simply unintelligible under these conditions: or, capital presents a material limit to the contingency of human rights. In other words, human rights might look like an open political discourse wherein different understandings of humanity can be inscribed, but its claimed openness is conditional upon any vision of humanity not seriously challenging reigning economic orthodoxy. One related way of thinking this question is through the distinction between form and content. 115 We could frame the matter thus: every attempt to redescribe the substantive human of human rights (as, for example, more ethically responsive or more multiculturally diverse) is mortgaged to the particular form of human right. One can have any human one likes as long as it can be a rights holder, which, it turns out, means a particular thing; form here sets the limits of intelligibility for substance. And, of course, the human rights form is still an abidingly liberal one: the human rights holder emerges as an abstract, formally equal juridical subject confronting a state which is envisioned simultaneously as the guarantor and most likely infringer of those rights. As such, human rights discourse is, as Orford has written, almost incapable in this form of comprehending the kinds of violence perpetrated today not by states or citizens under their control but, laterally, as it were, by the market itself.
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And it is precisely in a reflection on the capacity of human rights law to 'counter the demands of the market', 117 that Orford has proposed an attention to the politics of the forms of law operative in the human rights context (by which she means, more broadly, the 'pattern of relations and subject positions to which . . . laws attempt to give shape'). 118 Her analysis concludes that human rights law replicates the particular form of law found in the adjudication of trade disputes under the World Trade Organisation-namely one of sacrifice in which collective democratic interests are subordinated to the dictates of the market and in which a particular form of subject is configured and produced, namely a 'responsible subject of capitalist economics'. 119 Her analysis points to the ways in which the form of human rights law not only 'reinforces' market logic but also actually 'intensifies [the] subjection' it wreaks. 120 'The forms of law', she reminds us, 'are not apolitical and neutral' but rather work to inscribe particular possibilities and to foreclose others. 121 From a vantage point internal to the discourse of human rights and committed to the leveraging of its immanent possibilities this is doubtless a disheartening conclusion, yet I want to conclude on a countervailing note of optimism. Two notes, in fact. Orford again:
I want to think about whether economic law and human rights law somehow are complicit in creating a sense of despair, a sense that there are no political alternatives available, that we really have in some meaningful way reached that much-vaunted end of history. In trying to see whether there is some deep complicity between the forms of law, I want also to try to hold on to the idea that there is nonetheless something that escapes those forms of law, which might lead critique somewhere.
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The 'somewhere' to which Orford's critical instincts are led is a space (or, rather, spaces) beyond the form of human rights. I have not attempted to delineate these spaces in any detail here but clearly, in order to be properly incongruent to the official discourse of human rights, such spaces must refuse the language of human rights. That does not mean they are themselves free of compromise-they are political, and hence impure and messy spaces. Orford, once more:
[I]t was this figure of the other woman who haunted our discussions at the Gender and Transitional Justice workshop . . . . This other, who puts us into question, is the victim who refuses to be saved, the subject who will not speak her suffering in the time and place and languages offered to her by the mechanisms of transitional justice.
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Here she invokes a figure who returns to haunt the exclusionary certitude of official human rights narratives but who refuses to speak its language and in so doing to reform it or make it more inclusive. This figure evokes a modality of critique that does not approach human rights as a text to be rewritten but as a language not to be spoken. This type of critique might well acknowledge the contingency and the possible margins of change within human rights but refuse all the same to orientate its efforts towards that end, worrying that the form of human rights works to circumscribe and to recuperate those efforts. This type of critique might not want to relinquish universality, or universalisation, as an orienting principle yet still conclude human rights is not the only or the best means to attain it. This type of critique might conclude that the investment in making human rights mean something different takes place at the imaginative cost of creating new forms and new political vehicles and affiliations for the realisation of that universality, or justice or freedom however conceived. The possibilities are multiple and perhaps the gesture of refusing human rights as the starting (and critically redemptive end) point of such critical ventures actually adds to, rather than detracts from, those possibilities.
